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AUTONOMY
Gideon Parchomovsky* and Alex Stein**
Personal autonomy is a constitutive element of all rights. It
confers upon a rightholder the power to decide whether,
and under what circumstances, to exercise her right. Every
right infringement thus invariably involves a violation of its
holder’s autonomy. The autonomy violation consists of the
deprivation of a rightholder of a choice that was rightfully
hers—the choice as to how to go about her life.
Harms resulting from the right’s infringement and from the
autonomy violation are often readily distinguishable, as is
the case when someone uses the property of a rightholder
without securing her permission or, worse, causes her
bodily injury. At other times, however, the two harms
overlap, as in the case when a rightholder is unlawfully
barred from exercising her free speech right or is denied
the right to vote.
Furthermore, the autonomy harm may sometimes exceed
the physical harm sustained by the victim, as is the case in
many sexual harassment incidents. At other times,
however, the victim’s physical harm or economic loss will
outweigh the autonomy harm, as is often the case in
automobile accidents.
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Even though autonomy violations are omnipresent and the
harm resulting from them can be severe, the law rarely
recognizes a cause of action for violations of autonomy, nor
does it provide redress for autonomy harms. The current
legal approach to autonomy protection can best be
characterized as anomalous and unprincipled. Therefore,
from a normative perspective it is untenable.
In this Essay, we set out to make three novel theoretical and
doctrinal contributions. First, we advance a comprehensive
jurisprudential account of the relationship between rights
and autonomy. Second, we show why existing law should
be replaced with a legal regime that respects and protects
individual autonomy in all cases. Finally, we develop a
remedial framework designed to address autonomy
violations.
Mindful of administrability constraints, we incorporate
three limitations to ensure that our proposal does not
overwhelm the court system: (a) suits for autonomy
violations would only be allowed when the plaintiff has a
cause of action originating from the defendant’s
infringement of her recognized legal right; (b) any such suit
would undergo a strict de minimis scrutiny; and (c) no double
recovery would be allowed in cases in which the plaintiff’s
autonomy harm is subsumed in her physical or economic
loss.
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Introduction
Every right has an autonomy component at the very heart of it. The
autonomy component bestows upon the rightholder the freedom to
choose whether, and under which circumstances, to assert the
relevant right against duty-bearers. It also confers upon the
rightholder the power to transfer the right to third parties, when
such transfers are legally permitted. Stated differently, the autonomy
component of rights protects the rightholder from coercive
interferences by others. Isaiah Berlin famously defined autonomy as
imposing a requirement that a person be “an instrument of [her]
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own, not other men’s acts of will.”1 On Berlin’s view, which we
employ throughout this Essay,2 an individual must be the ruler of
her legal right in order for the right to exist as hers, free of
interference by other persons or by the government.3 This feature of
autonomy is embedded in its etymology that combines autos (self)
with nomos (rules).4
Autonomy is not an incidental feature, or a byproduct, of rights.
Quite the contrary: it is their very foundation. In his important
philosophical essay, “Are There Natural Rights?,” H.L.A. Hart
powerfully argued that if there is one natural right shared by all men
and women, it is the right of any responsible human being “to
forbearance on the part of all others from the use of coercion or
restraint against him.”5 According to Hart, the only reason to
suspend this right is if one is attempting to use it to coerce, restrain
or injure another person.6 And, while Hart employs the language of
liberties and freedom, it bears emphasis that the ultimate interest he
underscores as deserving protection is choice or autonomy—the
capacity of responsible agents to make decisions for themselves.
Hart’s analysis indicates that non-autonomous holding of rights is
impossible both operationally and conceptually.
In light of the importance of autonomy, one would expect the legal
system to provide effective protection to autonomy and remedy its
violations. Yet, the current legal regime concerning autonomy
violations is confused and internally inconsistent. Worse yet, it is
fundamentally misconceived from a deontological perspective.
In the vast majority of cases, where a plaintiff can show that she
suffered physical or proprietary harm as a result of her right’s
violation, she will be fully compensated for her losses, but will receive
no remedy for the violation of her autonomy. For example, when

1

2
3
4
5
6

ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 131 (1969). See also GERALD
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 13 (1988)
(discussing Berlin’s conception of autonomy).
See in particular Section I.A. below.
BERLIN, supra note 1, at 131-33.
DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 12.
H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 175 (1954).
Id.
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Oliver uses Ann’s property without her permission, or worse, causes
her bodily injury, Ann will receive full compensation for her
property or bodily harm. However, she will receive no compensation
whatsoever for the fact that her autonomy was violated by Oliver’s
incursion or attack. In standard cases, harms to autonomy incidental
to violations of other entitlements fall by the wayside, neglected and
unobserved, even when they are substantial and cannot be brushed
aside under the de minimis doctrine.7 Yet, in a very small group of
outlier cases, where the plaintiff fails to prove tangible harm, judges
and juries—who ordinarily fail to see autonomy violations—award
damages for harms to autonomy.8 These occasional sightings of the
right to autonomy typically yield nominal damages to the plaintiff,
as befits trifle violations of rights. Only in rare cases will courts use
these nominal awards as a platform for awarding punitive damages
to the lucky plaintiff.9
In this Essay, we reexamine the relationship between autonomy and
rights in order to advance a new legal approach to autonomy
violations. Specifically, we seek to make three contributions to legal
theory: conceptual, normative, and applicative. Conceptually, we
demonstrate that every violation of a right invariably involves harm
to autonomy, represented by the deprivation of choice suffered by
the rightholder. Autonomy thus ought to be understood as a secondorder right: the rightholder’s entitlement to do with her primary, or
first-order, right as she deems fit. Normatively, we take the position
that substantial harms to autonomy ought to be recognized and
remedied in all cases in which a duty-bearer deprives the rightholder
of the power to decide whether and when to exercise her right. Based
on this insight, we develop a normative claim that lawmakers should
recognize autonomy violations as actionable harms in all, but de
minimis, cases. We then devise a comprehensive remedial scheme
for righting autonomy violations. Finally, we propose a way to apply
our core normative recommendation by advancing a remedial
mechanism that allows courts to remedy harm to autonomy without
overburdening the judicial system.

7
8
9

See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.B.
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The contributions this Essay makes differ from prior philosophical
and legal investigations of autonomy. Prior work on autonomy has
elucidated the relationship between autonomy and constitutional
doctrine10 and identified the role of autonomy in the design of
property,11 contract12 and other core legal institutions.13 These
contributions, while no doubt important, focus on particular isolated
aspects of the relationship between autonomy and law.14
Specifically, they demonstrate how different legal institutions
promote individual autonomy.15
10

11

12

13

14

15

See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875
(1994) (analyzing aspects of autonomy promoted by the constitutional right
to free speech).
See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law
Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1264-65 (2014); Carol M. Rose, Property as the
Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 345 (1996). Frank I.
Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA
L. REV. 1319, 1329 (1987).
See, e.g., Robin Kar, Contract as Empowerment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 806
(2016) (associating realization of individual autonomy with the goals of
contract law); Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A
Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 101, 104 (2005)
(discussing autonomy-based rationales of contract law); CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2, 2021 (1981) (stating that autonomous individuals can freely choose to impose
obligations upon themselves in the form of contracts).
See, e.g., Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 167-77
(2017) (associating individuals’ right to autonomy with remedies for wrongful
interference with their reproductive choices); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends
With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 208-09 (2007) (stating that modern
family law promotes, inter alia, individual autonomy); Jana B. Singer, The
Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1508 (describing “the
migration from constitutional to family law of notions of individual privacy
and autonomy”).
One contribution we found mentions in passing a possible argument that
autonomy underlies all rights in private law, but declines to endorse that
argument. See Barker, ‘Damages Without Loss’: Can Hohfeld Help?, 34 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 639-40 (2014).
See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
1309, 1316 (2015) (“The metagoals of consumer law include consumer
decisional autonomy in the marketplace. ...”); James Edelman, The Meaning of
Loss and Enrichment, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 211, 236 (Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell &
James Penner, eds., 2009) (rationalizing the law of unjust enrichment as
protecting asset owners’ autonomy); Thomas O. McGarity & Elinor P.
Schroeder, Risk-Oriented Employment Screening, 59 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1025-26
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Our goal in this Essay is more ambitious. We set out to develop a
comprehensive jurisprudential account of the autonomy-law
relationship by showing that autonomy is a core component of every
legal right. Moreover, our account reveals that the relationship
between autonomy and rights is bidirectional: autonomy is not
merely a goal of legal rights but is also—and perhaps primarily—the
rights’ operating engine. Finally, we translate our theoretical
investigations into a set of new legal rules that respect and protect
individual autonomy.
Structurally, the Essay unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we explicate
the concept of autonomy as a second-order right, discuss its
centrality to legal theory and demonstrate our claim that every
violation of a right entails harm to autonomy. In Part II, we review
the current legal approach to injuries to autonomy, expose its flaws
and inconsistencies and explain why it fails to do autonomy justice.
In Part III, we develop our normative claim that calls for
remediation of all autonomy violations that are not de minimis and
then explain how compensation for autonomy harms can be carried
out expeditiously by the legal system. In Part IV, we raise and
respond to three potential objections to our reform proposal. A short
Conclusion follows.

I. The Place of Autonomy in Rights
A. The Concept of Autonomy
Autonomy has two important, yet distinct, aspects: primary and
secondary.16 The primary, or definitional, aspect of autonomy
identifies the autonomy’s point of realization. Under this
conceptualization, a person is truly autonomous when she chooses
how to live her life according to her will and self-determined goals.17

16
17

(1981) (“The preservation of individual autonomy is at the heart of our state
and federal employment discrimination laws.”).
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369-72 (1986) (distinguishing
between autonomy and the capacity for it).
Id. at 144, 370-71.
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Put differently, a person exercises her autonomy when she alone
“define[s] [her] nature, give[s] meaning and coherence to [her life]
and take[s] responsibility for the kind of person [she is].”18 To put
herself in this position, a person must use unfettered reflection in
order to scrutinize her “preferences, desires and wishes” and decide
whether she genuinely elects to retain them rather than substitute
them with a different set of wants.19 According to this definition,
autonomy is an important and conceptually distinct subset of
liberty.20
The definition of autonomy does not fully obtain in the real world
for all persons. The extent to which a person can actually make
autonomous choices crucially depends on her individual capacities
and life conditions. These two factors represent the secondary, or
operational, aspect of autonomy.21 For example, a person cannot
make autonomous choices when her mental capacity is seriously
impaired or when she experiences a severe emotional breakdown.22
By the same token, a person may be unable to realize her
autonomous choice to become a violinist when she cannot play
violin or when she must work at two jobs in order to provide for her
family.23
Critically for purposes of this Essay, life conditions affecting a
person’s autonomy also include her interactions with other

18
19
20
21

22

23

See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 20.
Id.
Id.
RAZ, supra note 16, at 372. See also Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism
in Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1114-22 (1989) (analyzing
and criticizing Raz’s account of autonomy).
RAZ, supra note 16, at 372-73 (“If a person is to be maker or author of his own
life then he must have the mental ability to form intentions of a sufficiently
complex kind, and plan their execution. These include minimum rationality,
the ability to comprehend the means required to realize his goals, the mental
faculties necessary to plan actions, etc.”). See also Robert R. Roca, Determining
Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, 62 FORDHAM L. R EV. 1177, 1196
(1994) (stating that “serious psychiatric symptoms” compromise the person’s
“capacity for autonomous choice”).
See, e.g., Wendy A. Bach, Flourishing Rights, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1061, 1071
(2015) (detailing how poverty undermines individual autonomy).
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individuals.24 These interactions are indispensable for any person
striving to live a safe, healthy, meaningful and prosperous life and to
maintain satisfying relationships with other people.25 Many of these
interactions involve mutual commitments and undertakings that
find their expression in people’s private orderings—for example, in
contracts, deeds, and articles of association—and in general laws. By
engaging in such interactions, a person changes the scope of her
autonomy and the scope of the autonomy of the individuals with
whom she interacts. Some of those changes expand the person’s
autonomy while others limit it. The rights and duties of a person thus
reveal how autonomous she is in her relations with other people. An
acquisition of a right enhances its holder’s autonomy. Conversely,
any addition of duties makes their bearer less autonomous.
This interconnection between rights, duties and autonomy is
unsurprising. Legal rights make their holder more autonomous by
allowing her, at a minimum, to choose between realizing and not
realizing the right. For example, a property owner may choose to
exercise her right to exclude others from her property in order to
secure her exclusive enjoyment of the property or for any other
reason.26 Alternatively, she may elect to allow other people to come
to her property. Reasons supporting this choice may include the
owner’s self-gratifying generosity or desire to form good social and
business relations with her visitors. Similar options are also open to
the holders of inalienable entitlements, ones that cannot be sold or
otherwise transferred to other people.27 For example, holders of the
inalienable right to vote in a presidential election are allowed to
choose whether to realize this right or do something else on Election

24
25
26

27

See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 8 (1989).
Id. at 30.
See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 157 (Wis. 1997)
(owners exercised the right to exclude because of fear of compromising their
ownership pursuant to the rule of adverse possession).
See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987)
(analyzing inalienability and connecting it to personhood); Lee Anne Fennell,
Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (2009) (examining inalienability
rules).
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Day. Rights unaccompanied by their holders’ autonomous power to
make this choice cannot be properly categorized as rights.28
Duties are the correlatives of rights.29 Any duty enforceable by law
therefore necessarily limits its bearer’s autonomy. For example,
when Joan chooses to exercise her right to free speech,30 the
government has a duty31 not to interfere.32 Similarly, when Paula
selects to exercise her contractual right to have David repay the loan
she gave him,33 David becomes obligated to pay her the requisite
amount. Under both scenarios, the duty bearer’s autonomy becomes
more limited. The government may want to prevent Joan from
speaking or even punish her for what she said, but, instead, it must
tolerate her speech. Similarly, David must use the money in his bank
account to repay the loan he received from Joan even though he
would rather buy himself a new car.
B. Autonomy as a Component of Rights
The straightforward correlation between autonomy and rights does
not fully reveal the relationship between the two. Autonomy is not
just a consequence of right-holding; it is also a constitutive
component of every right. Autonomy is, therefore, best understood
as a second-order right: an individual’s basic entitlement to choose
whether, when and how to realize her first-order rights and to have
those choices protected against unwelcome interferences by other
people.34

28

29
30
31
32
33
34

Because compulsory rights are intertwined with a duty enforceable by law,
they are best understood as imposing a caregiving or paternalistic obligation
on the bearer of the duty.
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913).
Under Hohfeld’s taxonomy, this right is categorized as a “privilege.” See id.
In Hohfeldian terms, this duty constitutes “no right.” Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 35.
Here, Paula would invoke a claim-right in Hohfeldian terms. See id. at 30.
For a similar idea, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 171
(1974) (observing that a central core of a person’s right in X is “the right to
determine what shall be done with X”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382579

AUTONOMY.DOC

2019]

5/4/2019 1:35 AM

AUTONOMY

11

The view we endorse is illustrated by the Connecticut Supreme
Court’s decision in Brett v. Cooney.35 The case involved an attorney
who purchased the plaintiffs’ house at a fair and agreed-upon price,
representing to the plaintiffs that he was buying the house for his
law-firm partner.36 In reality, the attorney bought the house for the
defendants, whom the plaintiffs considered “undesirable and
objectionable as tenants or purchasers.”37 The plaintiffs were
unquestionably defrauded,38 but they suffered no pecuniary losses
from the sale of the house, as the court expressly acknowledged.39
The court nonetheless decided that the plaintiffs are entitled to void
the conveyance they made for the following reasons:
The plaintiffs had the right to dispose of their house to whom
they would. The defendants fraudulently combined to
deprive them of this right, and equity will not suffer them to
retain the fruits of their deceitful trickery.40

An interesting and potentially more critical question that arises in
connection with this case is whether the court should also have
remedied the wrong done to the plaintiffs had their house been
resold to a bona fide purchaser prior to the proceeding. Under this
scenario, the plaintiffs would not have been entitled to equitable
annulment of the conveyance41 and could only ask for compensatory
relief.42 To obtain such relief, they would have had to prove their
damage. Because the plaintiffs showed unequivocal resolve to sell
their house for the amount they received from the defendants’
clandestine agent, their first-order right as owners of the house
remained intact. The deprivation they suffered only affected their
second-order entitlement to make an autonomous decision about
selling or not selling the house.

35
36
37
38
39
40
41

42

Brett et al. v. Cooney et al., 53 A. 729 (Conn. 1902).
Id. at 730.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 730-31.
Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted).
See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—
RESTITUTION (2d ed., 1993) § 4.7(1) at 451 (attesting that bona fide
purchasers acquire prevailing legal title).
The question of how to assess compensation for harms to autonomy is an
intricate one. We address it head on in Part III, infra.
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Harm to autonomy consists of the nullification of the person’s will as
a free human being. In the case at bar, the Bretts were unwilling to
sell their house to the Cooneys, but the Conneys and their
clandestine agent overrode this decision by fraud.43 This
nullification of the Bretts’ will violated their autonomy: it made them
chessmen in the clandestine game played by the unwanted buyers of
their house. The resulting harm to the Bretts’ autonomy was
unquestionably serious and warranted compensation.
Autonomy’s role as, what we call, a second-order right is
fundamental. Yet, it has not received the attention it deserves from
scholars and judges. In what follows, we address this omission by
explicating the nature of the harm to an individual’s autonomy that
results from an infringement of her first-order right.
In Brett v. Cooney,44 the rightholders’ autonomy was violated by
fraud. Fraud, however, is not the only means by which a person’s
autonomy can be violated. Autonomy can also be violated by force
or compulsion. Consider the textbook property case of Jacque v.
Steenberg Homes45 that featured an intentional violation of the right
of property owners to exclude others from their property. In that
case, a mobile-home company plowed a path through the plaintiffs’
field to shorten the delivery of a mobile home to a customer.46 Prior
to committing this intentional trespass, the company’s crew asked
for the plaintiffs’ permission to cross the field, but the plaintiffs’
refused to grant that permission.47 The company’s manager then
told his team to “get the home in there any way you can”48 and the
team followed that order.49 Based on these facts, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court overturned the appellate court’s decision to vacate
the punitive damage award granted to the plaintiffs by the trial court

43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Brett, 53 A. at 730-31.
Id.
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
Id. at 163–66.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id.
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and obligated the company to pay the plaintiffs $100,000 in punitive
damages.50
Commentators justified this decision based on deterrence theory,
suggesting that in order to discourage intentional transgressions on
property rights it was necessary to award punitive damages in this
case.51 A different justification, proffered by Professor Keith Hylton,
focused on the psychological harm to the plaintiffs, who previously
lost part of their property to an adverse possession claim.52 Our
autonomy-focused account suggests a very different perspective on
the case. The plaintiffs saw their autonomy sacrificed: they were
enlisted against their will to promote the defendant’s business.53
Instead of honoring the plaintiffs’ right to rule their property, the
defendant made itself a temporary ruler of that property.54 Although
50
51

52
53

54

Id. at 160-61, 164.
See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 83, 87 (2007) (“Courts reason that, because compensatory damages in
these cases are often nominal or very small, higher ratios are needed to deter
and punish reprehensible conduct that results in harm to the plaintiff beyond
any monetary loss.”).
See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87
GEO. L.J. 421, 445 & n.78 (1998).
See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 81-83 (2009), who makes the same argument as a
justification for forcing autonomy violators to disgorge their profits to the
victim. Specifically, he writes that “if I manage to enlist you in support of my
projects without your consent, I must surrender to you any gains I make as a
result. I must do so because the use I made of your right to set your own ends
must be treated as an embodiment of your freedom, and so given back to
you.” Id. at 82-83.
Forced use of another person’s property that causes the owner no tangible
harm has a historic illustration in English law: Watson Laidlaw & Co. Ltd. v.
Pott Cassels & Williamson (A Firm), 1914 S.C. 18 (H.L.). This case features
the following statement by Lord Shaw:
For wherever an abstraction or invasion of property
has occurred, then, unless such abstraction or
invasion were to be sanctioned by law, the law
ought to yield a recompense under the category or
principle, as I say, either of price or of hire. If A,
being a liveryman, keeps his horse standing idle in
the stable, and B, against his wish or without his
knowledge, rides or drives it out, it is no answer to
A for B to say: “Against what loss do you want to be
restored? I restore the horse. There is no loss. The

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382579

AUTONOMY.DOC

14

5/4/2019 1:35 AM

AUTONOMY

[Vol. nnn:nnn

it did so for a short period of time, the plaintiffs’ experience of being
disempowered and dominated by the defendant amounted to a
serious and irreversible harm that called for compensatory relief.55
The difficulties in meting out the right amount of compensation did
not make that call weaker.56
Autonomy can also be violated by accident. Consider an actor who
negligently causes fire that destroys another person’s building. The
wrongdoer in this example inflicts two distinct harms on the
property owner: the destruction of her building and the obliteration
of her second-order right to use the building according to her
autonomous vision.57 The first type of harm consists of the
unrealized rental value of the building and the cost of its
restoration.58 This sum, however, does not compensate the
rightholder for the harm to her autonomy. As in our previous
examples, this additional harm manifests itself in the rightholder’s
disempowerment: her lost ability to make and carry out meaningful
choices with regard to her property. Prior to the building’s

55

56
57

58

horse is none the worse; it is the better for the
exercise. Id. at 32.
This statement has recently been rationalized as a rightholder’s entitlement
to recover compensation for the loss of his Hohfeldian “power” to insist on
his right and stop the right’s infringement. See Barker, supra note 14, at 64752. This rationalization interprets Hohfeldian “power” too broadly. Under
Hohfeld’s account, legal power represents its holder’s ability to effect a change
in the underlying legal relations. Hohfeld, supra note 29, at 44-45.
Note that a property owner’s right against trespass allows for emergency
trespassing that aims to rescue people, animals and chattels. Under this
exception, the trespasser must pay the owner the market price for the
occupation of the owner’s property. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein,
Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1823, 1850-52 (2009), and
sources cited therein.
We address these difficulties below in Part III.
Cf. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 172731, 1755--56 (2004) (defending a decentralized property system that supports
owners’ idiosyncratic uses); Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control
and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 565 (2016) (rationalizing
entrepreneurs’ motivation to buy controlling stock in a corporation by their
desire “to pursue business strategies that they believe will produce abovemarket returns by securing the ability to implement their vision in the manner
they see fit.”).
See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 5.2 at 500-01, § 5.15 at 562 (describing repairbased and rent-based compensation as a remedy for asset destruction).
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destruction, the rightholder’s control over her destiny was more
effectual than after that accident. The wrongdoer therefore should
be obligated to compensate the rightholder for the erosion of her
autonomy, in addition to paying her for her economic damage.
Although our account is decidedly non-utilitarian, we believe that
our core claim is equally persuasive from an economic standpoint.
From the perspective of economic efficiency, autonomy confers a
valuable option upon a rightholder that allows her to decide whether
and when to exercise her right. According to economic theory,
options are important assets that are valuable by virtue of their very
existence.59 As such, they are bought and sold on markets and are a
standard feature in contractual arrangements. Naturally, when an
option holder is unlawfully deprived of the decision-making power,
represented by the option, she suffers a loss. The loss can be large or
small, depending on the particular circumstances and the nature of
the option, but irrespectively of the magnitude of the loss, in
principle, compensation ought to be paid to the option holder.
This economic insight escaped the attention of the California
Supreme Court when it decided the landmark case Moore v.
Regents of University of California.60 This case involved a leukemia
patient whose treatment required the removal of his spleen and
withdrawals of blood, bone marrow aspirate and other bodily
substances.61 Unbeknownst to the patient, his doctors used these
biomaterials for research.62 As part of that research, they developed
and patented a cell-line from the patient’s T-lymphocytes.63 The
California Supreme Court held that the doctors’ duty to obtain the
patient’s informed consent to the treatment obligated them to tell
the patient about their research and economic interests in his cells
and that their failure to do so vitiated his consent to the treatment.64
The Court, however, affirmed the demurrer of the patient’s suit for

59
60
61
62
63
64

See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL
ENTITLEMENTS 2 (2005).
Moore v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied 499
U.S. 936 (1991).
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 483-86.
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conversion that included a plea to recognize his proprietary interest
in the biotechnological products that the doctors might create from
his cells or the patented cell-line.65 The Court decided that human
cells cannot be a subject of ownership both conceptually and for
policy reasons.66 The Court also ruled that the patient’s ownership
claim was doomed to fail anyway because the cell-line patented by
the defendants “was both factually and legally distinct from the cells
taken from [his] body.”67
This decision glossed over the fact that the patient’s entitlement to
prevent the doctors’ use of his biomaterials had an option value. The
patient may not have owned these materials under the “title” and
“possession” criteria, but he was entitled to veto their use by other
people.68 This entitlement and its option value were part and parcel
of the patient’s right to make autonomous decisions about his
body.69 As such, it incorporated the patient’s prerogative to demand
remuneration for allowing others to use his biomaterials for research
and commercial purposes. The violations perpetrated by the doctors
affected primarily this entitlement: its effect on the patient’s right to
be informed about the treatment he received from the doctors was
marginal and relatively insignificant. Because the patient and his
attorneys made no complaints about that treatment, it was safe to
assume that it was adequate, if not more than adequate, from a
medical standpoint. The patient’s harm from the informed-consent
violation therefore was purely dignitary. As such, it entitled the
patient to recover only a modest amount in compensation.70 This

65
66

67
68

69
70

Id. at 487-92.
Conceptually, the Court explained that people neither possess nor have a title
in their cells and that cells consequently cannot be converted. Id. at 488-89.
Policy-wise, the Court reasoned that requiring scientists to investigate the
consensual pedigree of human cells “would affect medical research of
importance to all of society” and involve “policy concerns far removed from
the traditional, two-party ownership disputes in which the law of conversion
arose.” Id. at 487.
Id. at 492.
See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129 (N.Y.
1914) (Cardozo, J.) (“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body…”).
Id.
See, e.g., Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 701 So. 2d 447, 455-56 (La. 1997) (allowing
$5000 in dignitary damages for “deprivation of self-determination” and
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amount falls way below the sum that the patient could demand—
and potentially receive—for allowing his doctors and the institutions
that employed them—to use his biomaterials for research and
commercial purposes. The Court’s categorization of the patient’s
infringed entitlement as a right to informed consent, rather than as
an autonomous choice to sell the permission to use his biomaterials,
therefore clearly shortchanged Moore.71
These observations are not merely theoretical. A recent
experimental study, carried out by Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Cass
Sunstein and Tali Sharot, confirms that people strongly value their
autonomy and are willing to pay for it.72 Participants in the study
were given a task and offered a monetary reward for successfully
performing it. They were also given an option to delegate the task to
an expert. The results were striking: participants overwhelmingly
preferred to retain control over their tasks, instead of allowing the
expert to perform the task on their behalf.73 Critically, most
participants did not change that preference when delegating the task
to the expert promised them a higher reward.74 Instead, they paid
the “control premium” in order to act as free agents.75
II. Positive Law
The current stand of the law on harms to autonomy is, at best,
unprincipled, and, at worst, anomalous. The legal landscape, insofar
as harms to autonomy are concerned, has been largely shaped by
the injuria absque damnum doctrine that denies redress to victims
of wrongdoing who sustained no tangible damage, physical or
proprietary. By focusing exclusively on tangible damages and

71

72

73
74
75

surveying precedents upholding modest amounts of compensation for
dignitary harm).
Cf. Joanne Belisle, Note, Recognizing a Quasi-Property Right in Biomaterials, 3 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 767 (2013) (alluding to personal autonomy to justify an
individual’s quasi-property right in her cells and other biomaterials).
Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Cass R. Sunstein & Tali Sharot, The Intrinsic
Value of Choice: The Propensity to Under-Delegate in the Face of Potential Gains and
Losses, 2017 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 1, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166017-9259-x.
Id. at 9-10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
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ignoring other types of harm, the injuria absque damnum doctrine
has led to the virtual effacement of autonomy harms, rendering
them, by and large, a legal nullity.
Over time, though, the no-compensation rule has been riddled with
sporadic exceptions in a myriad of legal contexts—primarily medical
malpractice and constitutional law—that entitled victims to
compensation for violation of their rights, even without tangible
harm. Astoundingly, even in those cases, courts have not referred to
the victims’ autonomy interest when recognizing their right to
redress.76 Rather, courts chose to invoke questionable legal
constructs, such as “presumed harm”77 or to grant nominal damages
to victims and then supplement the award with punitive damages.78
In addition, at times, courts based victims’ right to redress on the
theory of dignitary harms.79
As we show, the legal tools courts employ to provide remedy to
victims of wrongful acts that resulted in no tangible harms created a
baffling array of doctrines that lack a coherent basis. More
importantly, we demonstrate that focusing on the victims’ autonomy
provides a superior way to do justice to wronged rightsholders.80

A. Injuria Absque Damnum
Among the many shortfalls of extant law, the doctrine of injuria
absque damnum (or injuria sine damno) stands out as most salient.81
76
77
78
79
80

81

See infra Sections II.B. and II.C.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra note 105 and materials cited therein.
Tacit recognition of autonomy losses can also explain the rule not allowing
wrongdoers to deduct their victims’ unwanted benefits from the
compensation they must pay the victims. For example, when a wrongdoing
that injures the victim forces her to change her job into a more profitable one,
the wrongdoer cannot deduct the victim’s additional income from the
medical expenses, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life, for which
he must compensate the victim. The extra leisure time “gained” by the victim
is not deductible either. Cf. Ariel Porat & Eric Posner, Offsetting Benefits, 100
VA. L. REV. 1165, 1187-88 (2014).
See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Int. Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 246 (1913)
(Pitney, J., dissenting) (“The result is, the legal paradox: Injuria sine damno.
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This doctrine recognizes harmless, and hence nonactionable,
violations of rights as a real possibility.82 Correspondingly, it holds
that a right’s violation does not by itself entitle the victim to recover
redress: the victim also needs to show that the violation caused her
cognizable harm.83 Courts apply this doctrine in a variety of contexts
to deny remedy,84 and even standing,85 to any plaintiff who fails to
demonstrate that the defendant’s transgression made her worse off
economically or materially.86

82

83

84
85
86

The plaintiff is wronged, but not harmed; it may sue, but may not recover”).
For an illuminating historical and critical discussion of the “injury in fact”
requirement for having a cause of action, see F. Andrew Hessick, Standing,
Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275 (2008).
See, e.g., Crawford v. Davis, 134 S.E. 247, 252 (S.C. 1926) (holding that the
“Injuria Sine Damno” principle is among the fundamentals of liability and
that a plaintiff needs to show damage to have a cause of action against the
violator of his entitlement).
See, e.g., cases cited above in notes 81-82; Brown Oil Tools, Inc. v. Schmidt,
148 So.2d 685, 687-88 (Miss. 1963) (“If the negligent act or omission has
resulted in no injury or loss to anyone, it is merely injuria sine damno,
although it involved violation of a statute or ordinance.” (citing Phillips v.
Delta Motor Lines, Inc. et al., 108 So.2d 409, 415 (Miss. 1959)));
Uppinghouse v. Mundel, 2 N.E. 719, 722 (Ind. 1885) (“[W]here an
unauthorized act results in [no, sic.] detriment or loss to another, if it is not a
damage in contemplation of law, it is injuria sine damno. Conceding,
therefore, that by the transaction complained of the appellant was compelled
to pay a debt which, by reason of our exemption laws, could not then have
been collected from him in this state, and that, under the circumstances and
in consequence, much annoyance and inconvenience were inflicted upon him
in his business, no injury, in contemplation of law, resulted to him from the
transfer of the debt in question.”). For a general discussion of this principle,
as related to standing, see Hessick, supra note 81, at 289-305.
See supra notes 81-83 and cases cited therein.
Hessick, supra note 81, at 306-315.
During the course of history, this doctrine had its challengers. See Ashby v.
White, 1 Eng. Rep. 417, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 955 (1703) (H.L.) (“It is impossible
to imagine any such thing, as injuria sine damno. Every injury imports
damage in the nature of it.”); Mayor of London v. Mayor of Lynn, 126 Eng.
Rep. 1026, 1041 (1796) (H.L.) (“[T]he inference seems unavoidable that
damages actually sustained could not be of the essence of the action, and that
the right alone was essential.”); Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585
(1851) (Exch.) (“Actual perceptible damage is not indispensable as the
foundation of an action; it is sufficient to shew the violation of a right, in which
case the law will presume damage; injuria sine damno is actionable....”). For
an insightful analysis of this important challenge and its implications for the
American system of remedies, see John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status
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This doctrine is flawed when applied to rights. For any right that
promotes its holder’s interest, “harmless transgression” is a
contradiction in terms.87 As we explained in Part I, every rightholder
has a second-order entitlement to do with her right as she pleases. A
right’s violation always denies the rightholder that entitlement and
reduces her autonomy. For that reason, it can never be harmless.88
Consider the following case: After contracting with Bob to sell him
her property at an agreed-upon price, Susan sells the property to
Andy—an unsuspecting bona fide purchaser who sees the value of
the property plummet one month later on account of a real estate
bubble that burst. In this case, Susan’s breach of contract causes Bob
no economic harm. Yet, it violates Bob’s autonomy by annulling his
rightful decision to buy the property. Reasons motivating that
decision lie within the scope of Bob’s autonomy and are not part of
Susan’s legal dominion. Susan has no right to decide for Bob
whether he should or should not buy her property, but this is exactly
what she did when she breached the contract. Under extant law,
nonetheless, the court will not obligate Susan to compensate Bob for
the harm to his autonomy.89

87

88

89

of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE
L.J. 524, 548-49 (2005).
The right not to be harmed by another person’s negligence—the cornerstone
of our accident law—was designed not to accrue in the absence of harm.
Under this design, negligent conduct that causes a prospective victim no harm
does not infringe any vested entitlement and thus does not amount to a
transgression. See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 1 at 4 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter: PROSSER & KEETON) (“a
wrong is called a tort only if the harm which has resulted, or is about to result
from it, is capable of being compensated in an action at law for damages....”).
Barker, supra note 14, at 639-40, acknowledges that forced use of another
person’s property can be conceptualized as a violation of that person’s
autonomy. According to him, however, “If loss of autonomy were itself an
actionable head of damage in private law, it would be hard to avoid sliding to
the conclusion that every rights infringement should give rise to a license fee
damages award.” Id. at 640 (emphasis in original). This argument skips over
the core characteristic of autonomy as incorporating every rightholder’s
second-order entitlement to do with her right as she pleases. Under this
understanding of autonomy, law indeed should provide remedy for every
nontrivial infringement of a right.
See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 12.4.(2) at 777 (observing in connection with the
breach-of-contract remedies that “The causation in fact requirement
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This hypothetical scenario stands in a stark contrast with the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s “informed consent” decision, Matthies v.
Mastromonaco.90 Comparison between those two cases unveils yet
another problem with the injuria absque damnum doctrine: the
problem of horizontal inequity. Courts applying this doctrine grant
remedies for autonomy violations in some cases while refusing to
grant those remedies in other cases that are equally strong. In
Matthies, an orthopedic surgeon prescribed bed rest to an elderly
patient suffering from severe backaches, without discussing with her
the possibility of having a back surgery.91 The surgeon thought that
such discussion was unnecessary because the patient had porous
bones that could not hold orthopedic screws.92 New Jersey’s
informed consent law derives doctors’ disclosure obligations from a
reasonable patient’s expectations—a broad standard that obligates
doctors to inform patients about all available treatments, including
those that the medical profession does not recommend.93 Based on
that standard, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the patient
had a viable suit against the surgeon for violation of her “informed
consent” right.94 The negative value of the foregone surgery option,
which involved a potential collapse of the patient’s bone structure
and the resulting threat to the patient’s life, did not prevent the court
from issuing this ruling.95 According to the court, the choice between
the risky surgery option and the bed rest that confined the patient to
her home and made her dependent on help belonged to the patient
rather than the doctor.96
By making the harm to the patient’s autonomy actionable despite
the total absence of any economic damage, the court opened up the
possibility for the patient to recover compensation for her
noneconomic harm. This possibility has been recognized by a

90
91
92
93
94
95
96

prevents the plaintiff’s recovery for any losses not proven to have occurred at
all....”).
Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456 (N.J. 1999).
Id. at 458.
Id.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 464.
Id.
Id.
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number of courts that interpreted the patient’s right to informed
consent as part of her broader entitlement to self-determination,97 in
tune with the seminal precedent, Canterbury v. Spence.98 This legal
development99 has removed harms to medical patients’ autonomy
from the “injuria absque damnum” category. As a result, patients
like Mrs. Matthies are often able to recover compensation for their
autonomy losses under the doctrine of lack of informed consent,
while other rightsholders whose rights are violated cannot get their
day in court, let alone receive a remedy. Our examples of Bob, the
property buyer, and Mrs. Matthies, the ailing patient, may be
different in degree, but are not different in kind from a rights, or
autonomy, perspective. Both of them involve wrongfully inflicted
harm to a person’s autonomy. Hence, if Mrs. Matthies deserves to
recover compensation for her autonomy loss, denying a similar
remedy to Bob will be manifestly inequitable.
The “injuria absque damnum” doctrine originates in the law of
torts.100 Under our torts system, when Angela takes a negligent
97

98

99

100

See, e.g., Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 96-1757, p. 15 (La. 10/10/97); 701 So. 2d
447, 455 (allowing dignitary damages for “deprivation of self-determination”
and “insult to personal integrity”).
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that a
doctor must present his patient with all possible alternatives that a reasonable
person would consider when deciding on their medical treatment). See also
Howard v. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, 800 A.2d 73,
78 (N.J. 2002) (relying on Canterbury v. Spence to affirm a “patient-centered
view of informed consent [that] stresses the patient’s right to selfdetermination”).
This development can be traced back to Justice Cardozo’s seminal decision
in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
(“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault for which he is
liable in damages.”). For full doctrinal layout of the autonomy-driven doctrine
of informed consent, see Katherine Shaw & Alex Stein, Abortion, Informed
Consent, and Regulatory Spillover, 92 IND. L.J. 1, 10-19, 29-31 (2016).
See, e.g., McVickers v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 194 F.Supp. 848, 849 (E.D.
Mich. 1961) (“It is basic tort law that wrong without damage does not
constitute a good cause of action.”); Fields v. Napa Milling Co., 330 P.2d 459,
462 (Cal.App. 1958) (reviewing and explaining the traditional tort doctrines
of “injuria absque damno” and “damnum absque injuria” as standing for the
proposition that “a wrong without damage does not constitute a cause of
action for damages any more than damage without wrong does not ordinarily
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action that puts Victor’s person or property in danger, but ultimately
causes Victor no cognizable damage, as well as no emotional harm
such as fear, shock or anxiety, she owes no duty to Victor to
compensate him.101 In this and similar cases, the victim’s good luck
inures to the benefit of the wrongdoer.102 Critically, though, this rule
only applies to accidental endangerments, as opposed to intentional
and malicious torts.103 Wrongdoers acting intentionally or
maliciously against another person are generally held liable to pay
their victims dignitary and other noneconomic damages, and
punitive damages as well.104 These remedies are intended to provide
adequate compensation to victims for their autonomy losses.105
Application of the “injuria absque damnum” doctrine to accidental
torts is perfectly justified. When a negligent action causes the
prospective victim no physical injury, emotional harm or

101
102
103

104

105

constitute a cause of action.”); Brown Oil Tools, Inc. v. Schmidt, 148 So.2d
685, 687-88 (Miss. 1963) (stating the same principle).
See supra notes 82, 83, 100 and cases cited therein.
Id.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 87, § 8 at 37 (observing that in intentional
tort cases “[m]ore liberal rules are applied as to the consequences for which
the defendant will be held liable” and that courts tend to allow plaintiffs to
recover compensation without presence of a tangible harm). See also David G.
Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L.
REV. 363, 376 (1994) (“When an actor intentionally violates the rights of
another person, the actor “steals” the victim’s autonomy, reflecting an
assertion that the thief is more worthy than the victim. If such thefts of
autonomy were not subjected to penalties in addition to the restoration of the
stolen goods (compensatory damages), the rectification of the transaction
would be incomplete. This is because such theft transactions contain two
distinct components: (1) the transfer of goods from the victim to the thief and
(2) the deliberately wrongful nature of the transfer in violation of the plaintiff
‘s vested rights—the illicit transfer of freedom from the victim to the thief.”).
See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.11(1) at 312. See also BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (setting up constitutional criteria for
imposing punitive damages, including reprehensibility of the wrongdoer’s
conduct); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425
(2003) (reaffirming and applying the Gore guideposts).
See Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice:
Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 282-83 (2005) (identifying
dignitary and emotional-distress damages among available reliefs for choice
deprivation); see generally DOBBS, supra note 41, § 7.3(2) at 635 (specifying when
dignitary damages are awarded).
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proprietary deprivation, it also inflicts no damage on the victim’s
autonomy.106 The reason is obvious. A would-be victim of a nonmaterialized accident experiences no forced restrictions on her
decisions and actions. She moves along with her plans without facing
any restraint or compulsion attributable to the negligent actor. Her
will encounters no unlawful interference by another person. No one
enlists her to promote his plans.
With property, contracts and other transactional areas of private law
things are different. Contracts induce one party to rely on another
party’s undertakings and modify her plans and actions in accordance
with that reliance.107 Breach of contract thus always harms the
innocent party’s autonomy—a harm that does not depend on
whether that party suffers economic damage as well.108
Consequently, there is no good reason for expanding the “injuria
absque damnum” doctrine from accidents to transactional law.
Unfortunately, a number of courts did exactly this, thus entrenching
the flawed concept of “harmless transgression.”109
106

107

108
109

Here, the no-compensation rule also serves an economic purpose by helping
the system to identify the most efficient enforcer of the applicable safety
standard. See Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs that Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the
Evidence Law and Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199,
1219-20 (2001) (explaining that tort victims are best positioned to enforce
safety standards because they have superior information and motivation to
sue); Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence
Rule over Regulation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 278-85 (2013) (showing that
liability triggered by harm brings about substantial savings in the law
enforcement effort relative to ex ante regulation of accident risks).
See Kar, supra note 12, at 761 (unfolding a descriptive account of contract law
as aiming “to empower people to use promises as tools to influence one
another’s actions and thereby to meet a broad range of human needs and
interests.”).
See DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL
THEORY OF CONTRACT 133 (2005).
See, e.g., Bediako Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 850 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2012),
aff’d, 537 F. App’x 183 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying the doctrine of injuria absque
damnum to deny damages in a credit case); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D.Conn.), aff’d 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953)
(applying the doctrine of injuria sine damno to an antitrust violation); Kane
v. Nomad Mobile Homes, Inc., 228 N.E.2d 207, 208 (Ill.App.1st Dist. 1967)
(ruling in a breach of contract dispute that since “there were no damages in
the claim of plaintiff ... the court should have entered a judgment against
plaintiff under the doctrine of injuria sine damno.”).
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B. Nominal and Punitive Damages
One technique courts use to mollify the harsh result of the injuria
absque damnum doctrine is to award nominal damages for rights
violations and then supplement the award with punitive damages.
This option allows courts to use even very minimal pecuniary or
property losses as a basis for granting remedy to rightsholders and
then use it as a launching pad for punitive damages. The celebrated
property case, Jacque v. Steenberg Home,110 in which the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of substantial punitive
damages, in combination with nominal damages of $1, as a
compensation for forcible trespass, is one such example.111 A more
recent example is the 2011 decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in Feld v. Feld that also dealt with
intentional trespass.112 The court applied the District of Columbia
rule that denies courts the power to impose punitive damages “unless
there is a basis in evidence for actual damages, even if only nominal
in amount.”113 Based on this rule and on the summary of the general
law in the Restatement of Torts,114 the court allowed the aggrieved
landowner “to seek punitive damages in addition to nominal
damages for his trespass claim.”115
Another example is the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in
Nappe v. Anschelewitz.116 In that case, the defendants convinced the
plaintiff to invest his money in their business venture in exchange for
a share in that venture.117 Shortly after making that investment, the
plaintiff discovered that the defendants diverted his money to
support another business.118 The agreement between the parties still
guaranteed the plaintiff the agreed-upon percentage of the profits
from the venture in which he wanted to invest, and the plaintiff

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
We discuss this case in Part I: see supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
Feld v. Feld, 783 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2011).
Id. at 76 (internal quotation omitted) (citing Maxwell v. Gallagher, 709 A.2d
100, 104–05 (D.C. 1998)).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 cmt. e.
Feld, 783 F.Supp.2d at 76.
Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224 (N.J. 1984).
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1227-28.
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therefore suffered no tangible harm from the defendants’ fraud.119
Based on these facts and after ascertaining the role of compensatory,
nominal, and punitive damages in our system of remedies,120 the
court ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to recover nominal and
punitive damages from the defendants.121 “[C]ompensatory
damage,” it explained “is not a requisite element of legal fraud.”122
According to the court, “Even if the person relying on the falsehood
were unable to establish actual damages, he should be entitled to
vindicate his rights through an award of nominal damages and in
appropriate cases to punish the defendant through an award of
punitive damages.”123
A final and perhaps most striking illustration of the use of punitive
damages to compensate for autonomy harms can be found in a
recent Canadian court decision, Abramowicz v. Lee, that won global
notoriety.124 The plaintiff, Abramowicz, was a prodigal clarinetist,
whose lifelong dream was to study at the Coburn Conservatory of
Music in Los Angeles—a stellar institution that offered him full
scholarship and an opportunity to study under the guidance of an
internationally renowned clarinet pedagogue.125 He applied and was
successfully admitted. Alas, the admission decision never reached
him. Unbeknownst to him, the defendant, his girlfriend at the time,
fearing that he may leave her to pursue his lifelong dream,
intercepted Coburn’s acceptance email and, in its stead sent the
plaintiff a fabricated rejection email.126 She then entered the
plaintiff’s email system and assuming his identity informed Coburn
that he decided to decline. Despite the enormous setback he
suffered, the plaintiff managed to become an accomplished
119
120
121
122
123
124

125

126

Id.
Id. at 1230-32.
Id. at 1232-33.
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1232.
See Sarah Mervosh, A Clarinetist’s Girlfriend Didn’t Want Him to Leave. So She
Crushed His Dreams., NEW YORK TIMES, June 15, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/arts/clarinetist-ex-girlfriendrejection-lawsuit.html.
Abramovitz v. Lee, 2018 Ont. Sup. Ct. 3684 (Canada),
https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2018/2018onsc3684/2018onsc3
684.html.
Id.
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professional musician, although the path to success was much
longer, expensive and treacherous.127
Years later, the plaintiff serendipitously discovered what had
happened and sued his ex-girlfriend for damages.128 The court
readily awarded him $334,000 for his pecuniary losses—the loss of
Coburn’s full scholarship and the two-year delay in his career.129 But
the plaintiff also requested compensation for a non-pecuniary harm
represented by the “deflection of his life.” Recognizing this claim,
the court granted the plaintiff $25,000 in aggravated damages “in
modest recognition of the anguish and hurt that has cost [him] no
money, but which has nonetheless hurt him.”130

C. Presumed Damages
Another doctrine courts use to grant relief in cases of harm to
autonomy—without recognizing it as such, of course—is the
presumed damages doctrine.131 This doctrine, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court, applies in suits for injuries that are
“likely to have occurred but difficult to establish.”132 In any such suit,
the court has the power to award the plaintiff damages that “roughly
approximate the harm that [she] suffered and thereby compensate
for harms that may be impossible to measure.”133 This power,
however, does not allow courts to award compensation to plaintiffs
who suffered no cognizable harm.134 Presumed damages, as the
Supreme Court explained, are merely “a substitute for ordinary
compensatory damages.”135

127
128
129
130
131

132
133
134
135

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 7.1(2) at 624-25 (outlining rules authorizing courts
to award plaintiffs’ presumed damages and observing that these rules reflect
“a desire to value some rights in themselves and not because they are
instruments of physical safety or emotional tranquility.”).
Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 311 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 310.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Courts have asserted their power to award presumed damages in
cases involving violations of substantive constitutional rights: for
example, the right to free speech or the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.136 Consider the case of a citizen who was
denied her right to vote—a possibility that was discussed in the
obiter dictum of several cases.137 Unable to find a “real” harm to the
citizen, but unwilling to condone the wrong done to her, courts
suggested that the aggrieved citizen is entitled to legal recourse based
on the epistemically contentious notion of “presumed damages.”138
Courts have also resorted to the “presumed damages” doctrine in
determining compensation for victims of defamation139 and other
dignitary torts.140 Unfortunately, the caselaw neither provides a
policy basis for presuming harm in certain cases (but not in others)
nor a principled method for identifying the rights whose violations
should trigger a presumption of harm. It is possible to argue as a
matter of logic that certain rights (or interests) are more important
than others. We are even willing to accept this proposition,
arguendo. Importantly, however, this assumption does not help one
to make sense of the presumed damages doctrine. Note that the
presumed damages doctrine focuses on harm, not on rights. A
violation of a right either results in harm, or it doesn’t. The
importance of the right involved cannot change this simple fact.141
Nor can the nature of the particular violation involved dictate,
without empirical support, whether harm should be presumed.

136

137
138
139
140

141

See Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging that
presumed damages can be awarded as a compensation for violation of the
right to vote); City of Watseka v. Ill. Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547,
1558-59 (7th Cir. 1986) (awarding presumed damages for violating First
Amendment right to free speech).
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 311; Hessel, 977 F.2d at 301.
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 311; Hessel, 977 F.2d at 301.
See, e.g., W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1154-59 (N.J. 2012).
Id. at 1159. See also Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 760-61 (1985) (approving presumed damages award to victim of
defamation).
The United States Supreme Court indeed held that the presumed damages
doctrine was designed to afford compensation for real harm and there is
consequently “no room for non-compensatory damages measured by the
jury’s perception of the abstract “importance” of a constitutional right.”
Stachura, 477 U.S. at 309-10.
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Our core insight that every right violation results in harm to
autonomy obviates the need to rely on tenuous legal presumptions,
as well as the need to devise cardinal or ordinal rankings of rights.
By our lights, courts should simply award redress for violations of
autonomy.142 As we explained in Part I, autonomy violations cause
victims real, rather than presumed, losses and deprivations.143
III. Remedying Autonomy Harms
The current stand of the law not only fails to do justice to the
important value of autonomy, which constitutes an indispensable
component of every right, but also renders the law unfair and
inconsistent. The law, in its present form, systematically
undercompensates rightsholders for autonomy deprivations, save in
those few cases in which harms to autonomy are actionable. Worse
yet, by undermining rightsholders’ autonomy, extant law deflates
the value of the rights themselves.
The doctrine’s effect on individuals who suffer an autonomy harm
that exceeds their tangible harm from a right’s violation is
particularly unjust. Such victims stand to receive a
disproportionately small amount of compensation that falls way
short of making them whole. As we noted, some courts attempt to
help such victims, without recognizing the root cause of the problem,
by awarding them presumed damages or a combination of nominal
and punitive damages.144 Not only does the use of these doctrines
fall short of offering a comprehensive solution to the problem, but it

142

143

144

Cf. Mike Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1492, 1492 (2014) (“Despite heavy criticism, the presumed damages
rule has had remarkable staying power in American law.”).
Under our framework, harm to autonomy would often subsume the victim’s
dignitary harm. This, however, will not happen in every case. There will be
cases in which the victim’s dignitary harm will be both separate from and
more severe than the harm to her autonomy. See, e.g., Abner v. Kansas City
S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 164-65 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming award of $1 in
nominal damages and $125,000 in punitive damages per person as a remedy
for racist slurs that created working environment hostile to African-American
employees in violation of Title VII).
See supra, Sections II.B. and II.C.
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also creates a secondary set of distortions. Because the doctrines of
presumed, nominal and punitive damages are discretionary in their
nature and are not tailored for autonomy harms, their use
engendered doctrinal uncertainty not only in the context of
autonomy harms, but also in the law of remedies in general. The
caselaw, outside the special area of medical malpractice, masks
autonomy harms by omitting specific reference to them, and
sporadically uses general doctrines to grant redress to victims on
other grounds. This ad hoc approach makes the law unpredictable,
inconsistent and inequitable.
A. Recognizing Autonomy Violations
We submit that the current state of affairs calls for a comprehensive
reform. Lawmakers ought to formalize a cause of action for
violations of autonomy and allow redress for autonomy losses.
Under the proposed rule, all victims who incurred an autonomy
harm would be able to get their day in court and receive a remedy
for the harm they suffered, unless the harm is trivial and thus
identified as de minimis.145 A full-fledged legal recognition of
autonomy as a protected interest would bring about fuller protection
of rights. It would also have the salutary effect of restoring the
integrity of judges, who would no longer need to resort to specious
doctrines, such as presumed harms, and artificial imposition of
punitive damages to grant compensation for harms to autonomy.
Any proposal to afford legal redress to autonomy harms must take
account of two concerns. The first is valuation. Autonomy harms
cannot be readily measured. There are no objective criteria, or
benchmarks, that can be used to assess such harms, and their
magnitude varies from one victim to another. The second concern
has to do with administrability. The formalization of an independent
cause of action for harms to autonomy and the addition of such
harms to the list of remediable losses will, no doubt, increase the
workload of courts and introduce delays in the administration of
justice. Both concerns are real and valid but are not insurmountable.
It should be noted at the outset that our legal system is no stranger
to interests and harms that are not amenable to precise
145

See Section IV.A. below.
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quantification. Privacy, consortium, and protection against infliction
of pain and suffering, for example, are all interests that do not readily
lend themselves to objective evaluation.146 Like autonomy, they are
highly individualized and person-specific. The extent and, indeed,
very existence of harms to those interests often depends on private
information that cannot be verified by objective evidence. Yet, our
legal system has long recognized such harms as actionable and
granted relief for them.147
As importantly, our system has moved in the direction of awarding
compensation to rightsholders without proof of harm, when it is
clear that there was a breach of a right, but the resulting harm is
unclear or difficult to prove.148 This trend is reflected in the doctrine
of presumed damages149 and, on an even broader scale, in the
proliferation of statutory damage provisions.150 Statutory damages
perform two distinct remedial tasks. They provide a means of
recompense to rightsholders without proof of actual harm when the
rightsholders suffer a loss that is either unclear or difficult to
prove.151 Statutory damages are also available to rightsholders who
prefer to forego provable claims for actual damages and to receive
the statutorily determined amounts instead.152
One possible way of overcoming the ascertainability and verifiability
problems that attend autonomy harms is to use defendants’ profits
as the benchmark of compensation. On this option, disgorgement
will become the remedy of choice in all cases.153 The principal
advantage of disgorgement is that it is predicated on an objective
measure that can be verified by courts, at least in principle.

146
147
148
149
150
151

152
153

DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.1 at 211, § 8.1(5) at 660-61.
Id.
See supra, Section II.C.
Id.
See generally, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in
Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009).
See Colin Morrissey, Behind the Music: Determining the Relevant Constitutional
Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3059, 3071 (2010).
Id. See also id. at 3072.
Cf. RIPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 81-83 (justifying disgorgement as a remedy for
violations of a freedom conceptualized here as autonomy).
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Disgorgement, however, suffers from three major flaws in the
present context. First, many wrongdoers realize no cognizable gain
from autonomy violations. Other wrongdoers generate profits that
courts cannot expediently ascertain and evaluate. Second, and more
importantly, there is no relation whatsoever between the
wrongdoer’s profit and the victim’s autonomy loss. The harm to the
victim’s autonomy may exceed the wrongdoer’s ill-gotten gain or fall
below it. Severe injuries to autonomy may result in small gains, or
no gain at all, to the wrongdoer—as in the case where Alan pushes
Beth against her will. Conversely, wrongful acts that produce
significant gains for the wrongdoers may cause only minimal injuries
to the victim’s autonomy, as in the case where Carol uses Dylan’s
phone without his permission to make a mega trade on the stock
exchange market. Third, and finally, although disgorgement of
profits constitutes an objective benchmark, it only partially alleviates
the administrability problem. Oftentimes, assessing the wrongdoer’s
ill-gotten profits is difficult, if not altogether impossible. At the end
of the day, therefore, using the wrongdoer’s profits as the benchmark
for compensation will not economize on judicial resources and will
not adequately compensate victims for harms to their autonomy.

B. Compensating for Autonomy Harms
For nontrivial, and hence actionable, autonomy violations we
propose setting up a two-pronged compensation scheme that
combines a fixed component and a discretionary component. The
fixed component would consist of a predetermined statutory award
to be granted in all cases of autonomy violations. The discretionary
component would be left to the court’s discretion and be limited to
cases of egregious autonomy violations. The discretionary amount
would always come on top of the fixed amount, and, naturally, it
would vary from case to case.
There are two principal ways to determine the fixed compensation
amount. The fixed award, or premium, can be a set dollar amount
or, alternatively, a percentage of the monetary damages awarded to
plaintiffs for their other losses. If set in pure dollar terms, the fixed
amount awarded for autonomy losses would bear no direct
relationship to the plaintiff’s economic losses. If the option of
percentage-based premium is selected, compensation for autonomy
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losses would be derived from the economic harm suffered by the
plaintiffs.
We believe that in most cases percentage-based compensation is
clearly preferable to the alternative of set dollar compensation
divorced from economic harm. Yet, percentage-based
compensation would not work when autonomy harms are
unaccompanied by economic losses. This challenge may be
particularly acute in the context of violations of constitutional rights.
For example, violations of one’s right to free speech, to vote, to equal
protection, and not to endure illegal searches often inflict small or
no pecuniary losses, while leading to considerable autonomy harm.
There are two solutions to this challenge. The first solution would
be to incorporate a presumption in favor of percentage-based
compensation, but allow courts discretion to order the statutorily set,
non-percentage-based amount, in those cases in which the plaintiff
suffered no significant economic losses. The second solution would
be to let the plaintiff choose her preferred method of compensation.
Under this alternative, a successful plaintiff will have the option of
selecting between percentage-based premiums and set amounts
premiums. The second option reinstates the victim’s autonomy
better than the first because it gives the victim the power to select
the calculation method for her autonomy losses.
As far as the discretionary component of the compensation is
concerned, it should be designed to enable courts to step up
compensation awards in cases involving particularly severe harms to
autonomy. The wrongdoer’s blameworthiness is an obvious
aggravating factor. Autonomy losses resulting from intentional and
malicious behavior warrant higher compensation than losses
resulting from merely incidental transgressions. All else being equal,
when a person promotes her own self-interest while intentionally or
maliciously disregarding the rights of another person, the resulting
harm to the victim’s autonomy will usually be greater than the harm
to her autonomy from an accidental transgression.
Another important factor that lawmakers ought to consider in
adopting a compensation scheme for autonomy losses is the
distinction between harms to autonomy associated with pecuniary
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or property losses and harms to autonomy that grow out of bodily
injuries. We believe that, in principle, violations of a person’s bodily
integrity result in a greater harm to her autonomy than wrongdoings
against her pecuniary or property interests. This presupposition
should be reflected in the compensatory scheme in the following
way: there should be a rebuttable presumption that autonomy losses
resulting from violations of bodily integrity should be compensated
at a higher amount, or premium, than autonomy losses associated
with violations of property or contractual rights. Incorporating such
a presumption into our compensation scheme would not only help
courts to form accurate assessments of autonomy harms. It would
also introduce predictability into our model and enhance the
expressive function of the law’s responses to wrongdoings.
Importantly, we do not categorically rule out the possibility of
awarding punitive damages to plaintiffs for egregious violations of
their autonomy. Such awards, however, should be reserved for
extreme cases, where courts believe that the wrongdoer’s behavior
was so reprehensible in terms of its effect on the victim’s autonomy
that it ought to be addressed by a stricter measure. Punitive damages
awards should be rare and the conditions under which they will be
granted should be clear.154 Otherwise, courts will be flooded with
punitive damages requests.
By our lights, the award of punitive damages in Jacque v. Steenberg
Home and Abramowicz v. Lee was warranted. However, the disparity
between the awards highlights the problem of punitive damages. In
Jacque v. Steenberg Home, the plaintiffs were awarded $100,000 in
punitive damages although they suffered no property damages and
the trespass, albeit intentional, lasted only a few minutes. In
Abramowicz v. Lee, by contrast, the plaintiff received only 25,000
Canadian Dollars in punitive damages, even though the defendant,
through her actions, derailed his life. From reading the cases, one
may emerge with the feeling that the amount awarded to the Jacques
was too high or that the compensation won by Abramowicz was too
low—or both. The adoption of our remedial scheme would inject

154

See DOBBS, supra note 41, § 3.11 at 312 (stating that punitive damages are
generally awarded against defendants “found guilty of particularly aggravated
misconduct”).
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much needed coherence into this area of the law, and, in particular,
would give rise to two benefits. First, by affording direct
compensation for autonomy losses, it would dramatically reduce the
use of punitive damages. Second, the parameters we specify for
computing compensation can instruct judges and juries in assessing
punitive damages awards, which should lead to more consistency.

IV. Addressing Potential Objections
In this Part, we address three potential objections to our proposal.
The first objection concerns the proposal’s administrability. The
crux of the argument is that implementation of our proposal will
overwhelm the courts by dramatically increasing litigation. The
second objection holds that courts actually afford redress for
autonomy losses, but they do so implicitly, or indirectly, via other
legal doctrines, without expressly acknowledging this fact. In other
words, courts mask autonomy violations under the guise of other
doctrines. We term this argument the “masking objection.” Third,
an argument can be made that our remedial mechanism does not
facilitate accurate assessment of autonomy harms and would
therefore result in insufficient or excessive compensation. We call
this argument the “inaccuracy objection.”
A. Administrability
The first potential objection we would like to address is the
implementability, or administrability, of our proposal. Many readers
may be sympathetic to the idea of offering redress for autonomy
harm, but at the same time, worry that doing so is impractical in
light of the limited financial resources of the court system.
Recognizing autonomy harms, so the argument goes, would lead to
the filing of innumerous new lawsuits and drive courts to the
breaking point. Mindful of this concern, we propose several
safeguards that are intended to avert this result. First, we would
allow lawsuits for autonomy harms only in those cases in which a
recognized legal right of the victim has been violated. In other
words, under our proposed scheme, claims of autonomy violations
would be actionable if and only if another, first-order, right of the
victim was violated. Accordingly, it would not be possible to sue for
autonomy violations on a standalone basis. Thus, the
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implementation of our proposal would not lead to filing of new
lawsuits. Second, we call on courts to apply a stringent de minimis
limitation to autonomy violations. The point and purpose of this
requirement is to sift out claims of autonomy violations that resulted
in insignificant or minor harms to autonomy. Third, we would bar
recovery for autonomy losses in cases in which the loss is subsumed
in an economic or property harm. By obviating the need to consider
autonomy losses for which the victim has been indirectly
compensated, the ban on double-recovery does not only promote
fairness but also administrability.

(1) The Independent Cause of Action Requirement
Under our vision, not every autonomy violation would be
actionable. Only violations arising from the breach of a recognized
right would entail an actionable autonomy violation. Hence, an
individual would be allowed to seek redress for an autonomy
violation only if she can show that the same act or omission that
brought about the autonomy harm constituted a breach of
recognized legal right. Hence, only individuals who have a
recognized cause of action in tort, contract, property, constitutional
law, and the like would have standing to sue for an autonomy
violation.
It is important to see that this limitation does not arise solely from a
desire to protect judicial resources. Rather, it is endemic to our
analytical framework. Recall, that under our conceptualization the
autonomy component accompanies recognized (first-order) rights. It
allows a rightholder to decide whether and how to exercise her right.
Where there is no legally protected right there is no legally protected
autonomy interest that deserves protection. Our goal in this Essay is
not to protect every choice, but only those choices that come with
the grant of legal rights.
Hence, not every time someone is adversely affected by the behavior
of another, she will be able to sue for an autonomy violation. The
activities of other individuals affect our lives daily. The decisions of
the government, on all levels, routinely restrict our choices, even
freedoms. To give a simple example, the decision of my municipality
to rezone my neighborhood can have a profound effect on my life
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choices. Similarly, the behavior of strangers often forces us to change
our plans. A slow driver on a narrow road may prevent me from
reaching my destination in a timely fashion. Furthermore, the
decision of a fellow train commuter to speak on the phone on the
train may upset my plan to read or work on the train. All of these
examples involve autonomy violations writ large. Yet, those
violations do not merit redress because they are free-standing: the
alleged violator does not detract from a legally recognized right of
the alleged victim.
Contrast the previous examples, with cases in which an individual is
denied a dwelling because of her race or gender or is forced to speak
against her will. In these cases, the victim will be able to sue not only
for the violation of her first-order right, but also to seek legal redress
for her autonomy harms.
The picture that emerges is clear. The implementation of our
proposal would neither inundate courts with new lawsuits, nor
would it facilitate the filing of suits that cannot already be brought.
Thus, the concern that implementation of our scheme would
paralyze the courts is wildly exaggerated. Allowing parties to recover
for autonomy losses would certainly increase the workload of courts,
but it is highly unlikely to drive courts to the breaking point. What
is more, the two other measures to which we turn next, would
further reduce the burden that our proposal would place on the
judiciary.
(2) De Minimis
The second safeguard courts should use to avert the risk of excessive
litigation is stringent application of the de minimis doctrine. This
doctrine holds that “de minimis no curat lex”—an expression
commonly translated to “the law does not concern itself with
trifles.”155

155

For a classic account of the de minimis doctrine, see Max L. Veech & Charles
R. Moon, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 45 MICH. L. REV. 537, 544-60 (1947)
(specifying and analyzing the criteria courts use to identify harms as de
minimis).
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The de minims doctrine is intended to ensure that minor infractions
of the law that do not result in significant harm are kept out of the
courtroom. A strict application of this doctrine to autonomy harms
would ensure that only autonomy violations that inflict a real and
substantial harm on the victim would be litigated. The adoption of
this measure is necessary to protect the two most valuable resources
of the judiciary: time and budget.
In light of the budgetary constraints faced by the legal system, it
cannot afford to remedy every minor violation of a person’s
autonomy. When the harm resulting from an autonomy violation is
relatively insignificant, allowing the victim to sue the violator would
impose on the legal system unaffordable costs while creating no
offsetting benefits. The legal system therefore must sift out trivial
suits in order to save its limited resources for more important
matters. Hence, insignificant violations of a person’s autonomy
should yield the person no right to compensation. For example,
assume that while attempting to board a subway train during rush
hour, two passengers rub shoulders at the doorstep of one of the cars.
Despite the unconsented contact, no lawsuit should be allowed. The
harm in this case is so trivial that it should be dismissed as de
minimis. Or, consider a case of a driver who trespasses a few inches
onto another person’s driveway while turning her car around on a
narrow street.156 This trespass temporarily overrides the owner’s
autonomous choice to exclude others from his property, but this
deprivation is minimal and thus should not be recognized as
actionable in our courts of law. Things, however, would be different
in intentional trespass cases such as Jacque v. Steenberg Homes,157
in which the trespasser turns the owner into an instrument to
promote its goals. Such violations of autonomy do not qualify as
trivial because of the victim’s experience of being overpowered and
subordinated by the wrongdoer.
Another paradigmatic example of a de minimis violation of
autonomy is an employer’s breach of an at will employment
agreement. Such breaches do not and should not go unpunished.

156
157

See Veech & Moon, supra note 155, at 550-51 & n. 60 (stating that courts treat
technical trespass as de minimis).
563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
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They call for compensatory relief, but the relief should only cover
the employee’s pecuniary, as opposed to autonomy, losses. Because
the employer can terminate the employment relationship at will
while paying the employee for her pecuniary losses,158 the residual
harm to the employee’s autonomy is minimal and thus does not
merit compensation.
(3) Subsumption
We would also bar recovery for autonomy harms in cases in which
the harm is subsumed in the alleged victim’s pecuniary loss. The
paradigmatic example is liquidated damages. Liquidated damages
are supposed by hypothesis to reflect all the losses a party stands to
incur in the case of a breach. By agreeing to a liquidated damages
provision, a party effectively consents to accept the stipulated
amount as compensation for all of her expected losses. Hence, if the
contract is breached, she should be precluded from arguing that she
should receive an additional amount of money for her autonomy
harm.159
By the same token, in the case of violations of certain constitutional
rights, the pecuniary loss and the autonomy harm are one and the
same. The denial of a free speech right or the right to vote may inflict
no pecuniary loss on the rightholder, but will set her autonomy back.
In such cases, double compensation is unwarranted; a single amount
should fully compensate the rightholder for her loss. With other
constitutional rights, however, things are different: violation of those
rights typically triggers two distinct losses. For example, unlawful
discrimination oftentimes inflicts a pecuniary loss—as with victims
who find themselves overcharged or underpaid because of their

158

159

See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (“Either party may
terminate an employment relationship with or without cause unless the right
to do so is limited by a statute, other law or public policy, or an agreement
between the parties, a binding employer promise, or a binding employer
policy statement.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW §
2.01 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2008) (“The courts in 49 states recognize
the principle that the employment is presumptively an at-will relationship.”).
We assume here that the contact is valid and enforceable and was neither
consummated under duress nor tainted by unconscionability, fraud,
misrepresentation, or illegality.
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gender or race—as well as an autonomy loss represented by the
choice the victim was denied.160
Another category in which autonomy harms should not be
compensable is that of assumption of risk. An individual who choose
out of her free will to engage in an extreme sport or adventurous
activity should not be entitled to receive compensation for autonomy
harms if she gets injured.161 Importantly, this result should obtain
even when the law allows actors to secure compensation for their
physical injury by invalidating contractual waivers on public policy
grounds.162 Arguing for an autonomy harm in such cases is
antithetical to the very concept of autonomy. And while it is perfectly
legitimate for society to provide compensation for victims who
assumed a risk that materialized and suffered an injury as result on
paternalistic or utilitarian grounds,163 it would be a stretch to allow
compensation for an autonomy harms in such cases.

B. Masking
The masking objection goes to the very premise of our project. It
maintains that although courts do not openly recognize victims’
right to recover compensation for autonomy violations, they
implicitly (and clandestinely) address the problem via other
doctrines. Hence, it is not true that autonomy violations are not
addressed by our courts; rather, they are accounted for indirectly.
We find this argument unpersuasive, even mystifying. Our review of
court decisions revealed no evidence of tacit recognition of
autonomy losses. On the contrary, in the majority of the cases we

160

161
162
163

See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky & Stephen F. Befort, Employment Discrimination
Remedies and Tax Gross Ups, 90 IOWA L. REV. 67, 71 (2004) (distinguishing
between different kinds of economic and noneconomic damages from
employment discrimination).
See, e.g., Alex Stein, The Domain of Torts, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 535, 575-76
(2017) (stating the rules governing assumption of risk).
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 213–214, at 541-46 (2000)
(outlining rules invalidating waivers of the right to sue for personal injury).
Id. (explaining the effectiveness and the ineffectiveness of waivers of the right
to sue for personal injury).
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discussed throughout the Essay, courts could indirectly account for
the victim’s autonomy losses, but openly elected not to do so.164
To be sure, one can insist that if courts chose to omit or camouflage
references to autonomy violations, no scholar would find them in the
caselaw. While it is impossible to disprove this argument, it is a very
odd one. As a threshold matter, it is not clear why courts would be
interested in concealing autonomy violations and how they
collectively arrived at this policy. Furthermore, it is equally unclear
what bonding mechanism judges employ to influence new judges to
abide by this policy and never deviate from it. The theory that judges
would go to such great lengths to mask autonomy violations simply
defies logic.
We have another reason for rejecting the masking argument as a
basis for objecting to our reform proposal. Assuming, arguendo, that
this argument accurately portrays the existing legal practice, is that
practice normatively attractive? We think it is not, for a fairly simple
reason. As Joseph Raz has pointed out, legal rules ought to be “open
and adequately publicized.”165 Legal rules need to possess sufficient
specificity, clarity, as well as formality, in order to minimize the
potential for arbitrariness and prejudice on the part of judges and
jurors who make decisions about individuals’ rights, duties and
liabilities.166 This fundamental requirement applies with full force to
an individual’s right to autonomy. This right and the remedies that
respond to its violations are too important to stay hidden in the
interstices of informal practice.

164

165
166

The California Supreme Court’s decision in the famous Moore case, analyzed
in Part I, is a prime example of this approach. As we demonstrated, this
decision characterized a blatant violation of the plaintiff’s autonomy, which
denied him the option to demand remuneration for biomaterials taken from
his body, as a patient’s right to receive from his doctors all information
relevant to his treatment. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text. This
characterization, as we explained, had a negative effect on the plaintiff’s
compensation entitlement. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 214 (1979).
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 667-68 (1984).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382579

AUTONOMY.DOC

42

5/4/2019 1:35 AM

AUTONOMY

[Vol. nnn:nnn

Finally, we think that even if for some unfathomable reason courts
remedy autonomy violations without explicitly acknowledging it, it
is paramount to make this reality explicit. For all the reasons
discussed in this Essay and the scholarship it cites167, autonomy is an
important value. As such, it should be openly and expressly
protected by our legal system.

B. Inaccuracy
The inaccuracy objection proceeds in two steps. The first step is
predicated on our own acknowledgment that accurate
compensation for autonomy losses is impossible and impracticable.
The second step consists of the inference that since accurate
compensation is unachievable, the law should award victims of
autonomy violations no compensation at all.
While we openly admit that our mechanism cannot generate perfect
information about autonomy losses, we disagree with the claim that
it should lead lawmakers to adopt a no-compensation regime. To
begin with, we believe that the inaccuracy objection is grossly
overstated. As we mentioned earlier in this Essay, imprecise
compensation mechanisms pervade our legal system and are used as
a matter of course in a myriad of legal contexts, ranging from
private, to administrative, to constitutional law.168 Of course, as a
matter of pure logic, the pervasiveness of imprecise compensation
mechanisms does not, on its own, call for adopting yet another such
mechanism: doing so will likely do more harm than good.
Yet, we believe that this is clearly not the case. The law regularly
employs imperfect compensation mechanisms for a reason: they are
supported by a powerful rationale that holds true in the case of
autonomy as well. These remedial mechanisms generate benefits
that outweigh their costs. These mechanisms, despite their
imprecision, promote fairness by providing compensation to victims,
and enhance efficiency by deterring wrongdoers. If these

167
168

See supra notes 1-5, 16-24 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text.
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mechanisms did not exist, wrongdoers would be motivated to
advance their own self-interest at their victims’ expense.
The same calculus justifies our remedial framework for autonomy
violations. As we demonstrated in Part I, autonomy rights are
important to their holders and to society in general. Fending off
autonomy violations is consequently important as well. We therefore
believe that the benefits of our proposed framework for remedying
autonomy violations outweigh its administrative costs. Furthermore,
we anticipate that those costs will decline over time as courts will
formulate compensation criteria that can be used in future cases.
Conclusion
Autonomy undergirds rights. It is indispensable to the definition of
rights and their functioning. Yet, to date, the law refuses to recognize
the interdependence between autonomy and rights and, as a rule,
offers no redress for autonomy losses. The current legal regime is
unprincipled and indefensible. Not only does it fail to acknowledge
the conceptual importance of autonomy, but it also shortchanges
rights, undercompensates rightsholders and often leaves them
without any redress for their most severe losses.
In this Essay, we reexamined the case for protecting autonomy from
three different perspectives: conceptual, normative, and doctrinal.
Conceptually, we demonstrated that autonomy is best understood as
a second-order right and that every breach of a legally recognized
right invariably implicates an autonomy violation. Normatively, we
have established the desirability of affording full legal protection to
autonomy as a necessary prerequisite for respecting rights.
Doctrinally, we developed a mechanism for compensating for
autonomy losses that takes full account of the limitations of our legal
system.
At the end of the day, our analysis yields a clear thesis: autonomy is
the cornerstone of all rights, and as such deserves to be explicitly and
universally honored by our legal system.
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